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III.

THE NAVAL FORCES OF BELLIGERENTS

A. THE NAVAL FORCES OF BELLIGERENTS ACCORDING TO
THE TRADITIONAL LAW
In warfare at sea it is important to be able to identify clearly the naval
forces of belligerents. The reason for this is that many of the rules regulating inter-belligerent and neutral-belligerent relations are dependent for
their operation upon the possibility of distinguishing between combatants
and non-combatants. Only the naval forces of a belligerent are permitted
to conduct offensive operations against an enemy. In addition, the treatment accorded to a belligerent vessel depends, in the first place, upon
whether or not the vessel forms a part of the belligerent's naval forces.
Whereas the naval vessels of a belligerent are subject to attack and destruction on sight, enemy merchant vessels are normally exempt fro1n such treatment. Whereas title to a vessel in the military service of an enemy immediately vests in the government of the captor by virtue of the fact of capture,
title to an enemy merchant vessel normally depends upon adjudication by a
prize court. So also may the treatment of personnel taken from enemy vessels differ, depending upon the status of the vessel. Finally, the traditional
rules governing neutral-belligerent relations in naval war presuppose
throughout the possibility of distinguishing between the naval forces of
belligerent and belligerent merchant vessels. 1
Although the naval forces of states comprise vessels, aircraft and personnel, the warship remains the main combatant unit in warfare at sea and
therefore forms the principal object of inquiry. 2 While there is no multilateral convention that directly defines a warship, Hague Convention VII
(r907), by enumerating the conditions that must be satisfied in order to convert a merchant vessel into a warship, indirectly defined the latter. In this
Convention a vessel in order to qualify as a warship must be placed under
the direct authority, immediate control, and the responsibility of the power
whose flag it flies; it must bear the external marks distinguishing the warships of the state under whose authority it acts; the commander of the ves1

See pp. 56 ff.

2 To this extent,

a discussion of lawful combatants in naval warfare differs from a similar discus-.
sion in relation to land warfare where attention is directed primarily toward determining the sta;.
tus of personnel. As a general rule, in naval warfare the combatant status of the vessel is sufficient
to determine the combatant status of the personnel on board the vessel. This is equally true
for aircraft, the combatant status of the vessel being extended to aircraft carried on board.
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seltnust be in the service of the state, duly commissioned, and listed among
the officers of the fighting fleet; the crew must be subject to naval discipline;
and the vessel must observe in its operation the laws and customs of war.
In principle, these criteria may still be regarded as furnishing the distinctive
features of warships. 3
Included among the commissioned naval forces of states are many vessels
that are neither heavily armed nor capable, in fact, of carrying out offensive
operations against an enemy. The suggestion has occasionally been put
forward that such vessels ought not to be subject to the same treatment
meted out to heavily armed warships. 4 However, the practice of states
has not been to consider these naval vessels as possessing a status essentially
different from the status of naval vessels whose primary purpose is to conduct offensive operations. 5 It is the fact of being duly commissioned as a
naval vessel, hence being legally competent to exercise belligerent rights at
sea, that is the decisive consideration, and not the fact that many naval
vessels may be only lightly armed or perhaps altogether without offensive
armament. 6 A consequence of this incorporation into the naval forces of a
belligerent, and the attending legal competence to exercise belligerent
rights, is the liability to attack and destruction on sight.
Thus commissioned naval vessels, commanded by commissioned naval
officers and flying the naval ensign, which serve either to transport the
armed forces of belligerents or to perform various auxiliary services to
fighting vessels (i. e., supply tenders, colliers, etc.) are subject, in principle,
to the same treatment as naval vessels whose purpose is to conduct offensive
operations at sea. To this extent, at least, it would appear misleading to
distinguish between the ''combatant'' and ''non-combatant'' naval forces
3

See Law of Naval Warfare, Section sooc. Among writers the following statement may be
considered to be representative: "The essential features of a warship are that her commander
holds a commission from his state, the ship flies the flag of the navy which in many countries
is different from that of the merchant marine, and the officers and crew are under naval discipline." Higgins and Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, (2.nd ed. rev. by C. John
Colombos, 1951), p. 350.
4 C. C. Hyde, for example, states that "the public belligerent ship which is impotent to
fight through lack of armament should not be dealt with as though it were a dreadnought.
Hence there appears to be need of a fresh classification differentiating the fighting from the nonfighting public vessels of a belligerent, in case at least it be acknowledged that both are not to
be treated alike by an enemy." International Law, Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied By The
United States (2.nd. rev. ed., 1945), Vol. 3, p. 192.0.
5 A similar position is taken by Professor Guggenheim (op. cit., p. 32.6), who points out that
as long as a vessel makes up a part of the naval forces of a belligerent, in the sense described
in the text above, it is immaterial whether or not the vessel is armed in the regular manner of
warships.
6 Exception must be made, of course, for naval hospital vessels and cartel vessels, which bear
a special status. Although included within the naval forces of belligerents, neither of these
categories of vessels is legally capable of exercising belligerent rights at sea, and the unlawful
exercise of belligerent rights serves to deprive hospital and cartel vessels of the special protection
otherwise guaranteed to them. See pp. 96-8, u6-8,
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of belligerents. 7 Whatever differentiation in treatment is to be given to
these two categories of naval vessels must instead be attributed to the rule
obligating belligerents to apply only that degree of force required for the
submission of the enemy. 8
A special problem concerns the conversion of merchant vessels into
warships. In both World Wars the naval belligerents freely resorted to
the practice of converting merchant vessels into warships. So long as
such conversion was effected within the jurisdiction of the belligerent
resorting to conversion (or within the jurisdiction of Allies) and the
converted vessel fulfilled the requirements stipulated in Hague Convention
VII (I907), requirements which have already been summarized, there was
no serious disposition to challenge the right of converting merchant vessels
into warships. But neither Hague Convention VII (I907) nor subsequent
practice succeeded in settling the question as to whether merchant vessels
may be converted on the high seas. 9
Although the legitimacy of converting merchant vessels into warships
must be considered as well established, it has been contended that to permit
conversion revives, in fact if not in law, the centuries old practice of privateering, a practice formally abolished by the Declaration of Paris of I856.
There is much to be said for this view. 10 It is quite true that the control
7 Frequently, however, this distinction results from the fact that belligerents employ vessels
in order to perform auxiliary services to combatant naval units though without formally
incorporating such vessels into the naval forces. Vessels so serving belligerent forces may
retain their private ownership and merely serve under charter to the belligerents for the purposes of the war. On the other hand, they may be owned by the government. In any event,
unless commissioned as naval vessels they are not competent to exercise belligerent rights at
sea. Thus the term "fleet auxiliaries" must be used with caution, since it may refer to vessels
formally incorporated into the naval forces of a belligerent, and therefore competent to exercise
belligerent rights, and those not formally incorporated. Neither the fact that both categories
of vessels perform essentially similar services nor the fact that both categories are subject to the
same liabilities if encountered by an enemy (i. e., attack and destruction) should serve to obscure
this distinction.
8 See pp. 46-5o.
9 Conversion within neutral jurisdiction being clearly prohibited.
In practice, however,
the question as to whether merchant vessels may be converted on the high seas did not prove to
be too significant a controversy in either World War. Far more important has been the dispute over the status of vessels that have not been openly converted, but that have been "defensively" armed and subjected to a considerable measure of state control (see pp. 58 ff.). A
further unsettled point concerns the legality of reconversion as well as the place where reconversion may take place, if permitted.
to E. g., Stone asks whether Hague Convention VII (1907) was not "an abrogation pro tanto
of the rule of the Declaration of Paris which abolished privateering. Analytically . . . Hague
Convention No. 7 contains no such abrogation. Yet it seems idle to blink the fact that functionally the Convention sanctions the use of merchantmen to fill gaps in regular navies formerly
filled by the privateers." op. cit., p. 576. These views echo the opinions of earlier writers. On
the other hand, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht declares that: "The opinion . . . that by permitting·
the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war privateering had been revived, is unfounded,
for the rules of Convention VII in no way abrogated the rule of the Declaration of Paris that
privateering is and remains abolished." op. cit ., p. 2.65.
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belligerents now exercise over converted merchant vessels, and the disappearance of the motive of personal gain, has served to remove some of the
most undesirable features that were characteristic of privateering. Yet i t
seems equally true that widespread resort to conversion serves to fulfill in
large measure the principal function formed y accomplished through the use
of privateers. Through the conversion of merchant ships a weak naval
power hopes to compensate for its weakness in much the same manner that
weak naval powers in the past compensated for t.heir weakness by the use
of privateers. In view of the disparity that will usually exist between a
regular warship and a converted merchant vessel, the principal use of the
latter must be-and in practice has been-confined to forays against enemy
merchant shipping. Rather than utilize his warships for the protection
of merchant shipping, the belligerent against whom such converted merchant vessels operate will resort to the defensive arming of his merchant
vessels. In this manner the widespread use by belligerents of converted
merchant vessels has been one factor, in addition to the submarine and aircraft, that has served to lead to the present unsettled status of the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants in naval warfare.

B. THE PROBLEM TODAY
The preceding considerations have dealt with the identifying characteristics of naval forces, characteristics which are well established by the customary practices of states. Vessels possessing these characteristics are
competent to exercise belligerent rights at sea, are subject to attack and
destruction at sight by the military forces of an enemy, and are obligated
to observe certain restrictio?s when in neutral territorial waters and ports. 11
Recent developments, however, have served to cast considerable doubt upon
the adequacy of the characteristics established by the traditional law for
identifying the naval forces of belligerents. The criticism is increasingly
made that the traditional law, and the formal requirements laid down by
this law, are no longer entirely appropriate given the circumstances under
which the two World Wars were fought. More specifically, it has been
held that the traditional law fails to include within the naval forces of
belligerents many vessels which constitute at present an integral part of a
belligerent's military effort at sea.
This criticism undoubtedly warrants the most serious consideration.
Despite the obvious importance of being able to identify clearly the naval
forces of belligerents the task has never proven easy. The traditional
law attempted to resolve some of the difficulties involved in making this
identification by drawing a distinction between those vessels competent to
exercise belligerent rights and those vessels not so competent but whose
behavior might nevertheless result in liability to the same treatment as
belligerent warships. Competence to exercise belligerent rights, as already
11

See pp. 2.19-45 for a discussion of such restrictions.
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noted, is vested by the traditional law only in those vessels that are formally
incorporated into the naval forces of a belligerent, that are commanded
by a commissioned naval officer and manned by a crew submitted to naval
discipline, and that fly the naval ensign. On the other hand, any merchant
vessel-including the merchant vessels of neutral states-could become
liable to the same treatment as belligerent warships, such liability following
from the performance of certain acts. Thus a merchant vessel actively
resisting visit and search or performing certain acts of direct assistance to
the military operations of a belligerent has always been considered as
subjecting itself to . attack and possible destruction. 12 Nevertheless, this
liability of merchant vessels did not warrant their being considered as
bearing the same legal status as the naval forces of belligerents. In particular, the subjection of merchant vessels to treatment similar to that
meted out to belligerent warships did not, for that reason, serve to confer
upon such vessels the rights which belonged only to warships.
The utility of this distinction admittedly has been substantially reduced
today when belligerents either own and operate directly all vessels engaged
in trade or submit the activities of privately owned vessels to far reaching
controls. The traditional law necessarily assumed that the occasions in
which privately owned and operated vessels would become liable to the
same treatment as warships would be limited in number. Perhaps equally
important was the assumption that this liability of merchant vessels would
follow-when it did occur-as the result of acts freely undertaken by the
owners of private vessels. These assumptions are valid only to a very
limited extent at present, and it is with their gradual disappearance during
the two World Wars that the principal difficulty involved in identifying
the naval forces of belligerents is intimately related. The "defensive"
arming of belligerent merchant vessels at the direction and expense of the
state, the manning of defensive armament by naval gun crews, sailing under
convoy of warships, and the incorporation of merchant vessels into the
intelligence system of the belligerent, have become common practices.
It may, of course, be argued that despite this ever increasing control
exercised over merchant vessels, that despite this growing integration of
rnerchant vessels with the military forces of a belligerent, the legal status
of merchant vessels-whether publicly or privately owned-remains essentially unchanged so long as such vessels do not satisfy the strict requirements of warships as established by the traditional law. 13 The accuracy
12

See pp. 56-7, 67-70, 319-u., 3361.
In one opinion of the American-German Mixed Claims Commission, established after
World War I, adjudicating claims for compensation of losses suffered through the destruction
of ships by Germany or her allies, the following conclusion was reached: "Neither (a) the
arming for defensive purposes of a merchantman, nor (b) the manning of such armament by·a
naval gun crew, nor (c) her routing by the Navy Department of the United States for the purpose of avoiding the enemy, nor (d) the following by the civilian master of such merchantman
of instructions given by the Navy Department for the defense of the ship when attacked by or
13
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of this contention must be found, however, largely in the identification of
.. legal status" with the competence to exercise belligerent rights at sea.
It cannot prejudice the possible conclusion that this lack of competence
to exercise belligerent rights does not-at the same time-also serve to
confer upon merchant vessels continued exemption from the liability of
commissioned naval vessels to attack and possible destruction. 14 It should
further be observed that if the principal purpose of restricting the legal
status of naval forces to those vessels possessing the characteristics of warships as established by the traditional law is to preserve the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants in naval warfare this purpose is
not being well served. For the apparent effect of retaining the traditional
requirements in a period when merchant vessels are increasingly integrated
into the military effort of belligerents is to deprive such vessels of the immunities of non-combatants while at the same time denying them the full
rights conferred upon combatants in warfare at sea.
C. AERIAL FORCES IN WARFARE AT SEA
It is hardly possible to assert that the identifying characteristics of combatant forces in aerial warfare has as yet been resolved in a definitive
manner. In the absence of international convention regulating this aspect
of aerial warfare such regulation as does exist must be based either upon
an application to aerial warfare of the rules identifying legitimate combatants in naval or land warfare or upon the actual practices of belligerents
in the conduct of aerial warfare. Both of these possibilities involve certain
difficulties. The practices of belligerents during World War II were not
always uniform, and even where a marked degree of uniformity was apparent doubt may remain as to whether so short a practice is to be considered
as satisfying the requirements of customary law .15 The application ''by
analogy'' of the requirements lawful combatants must meet either in naval
or land warfare is objectionable if only for the reason that aerial warfare
is a distinct form of waging war, which cannot be easily assimilated to
the older forms of warfare. The differences existing between land and
naval warfare with respect to the identification of legitimate combatants
in danger of attack by the enemy, nor (e) her seeking the protection of a convoy and submitting
herself to naval instructions as to route and operation for the purpose of avoiding the enemy,
nor all of these combined will suffice to impress such merchantman with a military character."
At the same time, however, the Commission expressly disclaimed passing judgment upon
whether any of the conditions enumerated above entitled Germany, according to the existing
rules of international law, to attack and destroy allied merchant vessels. U. S. Naval War
College, International Law Decisions and Notes, I92J, pp. 189-90, 2.14.
14
See pp. 55-70 for a detailed discussion of the conditions under which belligerent merchant
vessels may be attacked and destroyed either with or without prior warning.
15 See pp. 2-7 ff.
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should constitute a warning against attempts to apply to aerial warfare
rules operative to troops on land or to vessels at sea. 16
In this study the problem of identifying legitimate combatants in aerial
warfare is limited to aircraft which either make up a part of the naval forces
of belligerents or which participate in operations of a naval character. In
the light of this qualification and of the relevant practices of World War II
the following tentative conclusions may be drawn. In principle, the characteristics considered essential to qualify a vessel to exercise belligerent
rights at sea have been applied to the conduct of aerial warfare as well.
During World War II there was a general disposition on the part of the
belligerents to consider as entitled to exercise belligerent rights only those
aircraft that were incorporated into the military forces of the state, that
were commanded and manned by military personnel, and that showed such
marking as would clearly indicate nationality and military character. 17
16 Thus an element of uncertainty remains as to whether in naval warfare the identifying
characteristics of lawful combatants should attach to the aircraft (as in naval warfare to the
vessel), to the personnel manning the aircraft (as in land warfare to troops), or to both aircraft
and personnel. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3rd. ed., 1947), pp. 76 ff., contends
that in aerial warfare combatant identification must be primarily attached to the aircraft, that
aircraft are obligated to use the military markings of their state, and that personnel are not
required to wear a uniform (identity tokens being sufficient to establish combatant status).
It is apparent that Spaight considers aerial warfare to resemble, in this respect at least, naval
warfare. Stone (op. cit., p. 612.), on the other hand, questions these conclusions, and while
admitting that practice to date suggests an ''inchoate prohibition" against the use of false
markings by aircraft, asserts that the details of any clear prohibition to this effect have yet
to emerge.
17 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section sood.-For a review of World War II practices regarding
combatant quality in aerial warfare, see Spaight, op. cit., pp. 76-107.-Articles 13 and 14 of
the unratified 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare, drafted by the Commission of Jurists at The Hague,
stated that: "Belligerent aircraft are alone entitled to exercise belligerent rights . . . A military aircraft shall be under the command of a person duly commissioned or enlisted in the
military service of the State; the crew must be exclusively military." The General Report
on these provisions of the 192.3 Rules declared that: "Belligerent rights at sea can now only be
exercised by units under the direct authority, immediate control and responsibility of the State.
This same principle should apply to aerial warfare. Belligerent rights should therefore only
be exercised by military aircraft . . . Operations of war involve the responsibility of the
State. Units of the fighting forces must, therefore, be under the direct control of persons
responsible to the State. For the same reason the crew must be exclusively military in order
that they may be subject to military discipline." U. S. Naval War College, lntemational Law
Documents, I924, p. II4·

